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Operation Candor

President Eisenhower's top planners and policymakers were busily at work last week on a mammoth reporting project. In the Administration's books, it was labeled Operation Candor—a series of speeches by the President, his Cabinet members, and others of quasi-Cabinet rank reporting to the American people just what the government was up against in such areas as defense, foreign policy, atomic weapons, and taxation.

The idea of a comprehensive report, to be carried to all corners of the nation by television and radio, grew out of Mr. Eisenhower's pre-Inauguration conviction that the American people often opposed necessary programs because they did not fully understand the facts which motivated them. He felt, for example, that had the people been told about Soviet military strength right after the second world war, they would never have permitted hasty demobilization.

Atomic Revelations: Operation Candor called for seven major policy pecches. The first, delivered by the President himself, would lay out the broad outline of the series. In general erms, it would get down to the hard ruth on the state of the world and then describe the Administration's proposals or coping with the situation. Specifically, he President would lay on the line curently secret information about America's tomic position and the Soviet Union's.

The President's speech, tentatively cheduled for the early part of October, would be followed by a full rehearsal of J.S. foreign policy. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Sen. Alexander Wiley, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, were expected to lean heavily on the need for allies and foreign

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bases as requisites to international security. A panel discussion of defense would be handled by Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and Deputy Defense Secretary Roger Kyes. Air defense against atomic attack and the daugers of relaxing military preparedness would be stressed.

Cloak and Dagger: If the President agreed, the next feature of Operation Candor would be a full, frank discussion by Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Lewis Strauss, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, of the Soviet Union's atomic muscles—even to estimating as closely as possible its A-bomb stockpile.

Treasury Secretary George Humphrey would answer the key question: Who pays the piper, and how much? Taxes, the balanced budget, and the percentage of the national income necessary to finance an adequate air-atomic defense would be his topic. Before the President summed up, in the last broadcast of the series, U.N. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and Foreign Operations Administrator Harold Stassen would talk on collective security and the United Nations.

Last week, White House advisers and teams from various government agencies were busy writing the speeches. The President's kickoff address was in almost final form. Some of the other programs, such as the Lodge-Stassen talk, which did not present too many difficulties, were well along. But the exposition of atomic strategy, both American and Soviet, was still largely in the talking stage.